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EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE
 
OF FAMILIES
 
MARTHA M. ERTMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Ivan Illich’s cut-to-the bone linkages between gender and in­
dustrial capitalism in Gender1 leave me nearly speechless.  Never­
theless, like Salieri stuttering about Mozart’s genius, I cannot help 
but offer a few thoughts about his grand screed against economic 
thinking, accusing it of undermining gender, social organization, 
and our very humanity.  His ideas, which incensed some feminists in 
the 1980s,2 have retained their shock value, and even freshness, de­
spite the many changes in law and culture over the past three de­
cades.  By combining far-left and far-right thinking to up-end cozy 
assumptions like equality-is-good-for-women, Illich all but guaran­
teed feminist ire.  But Gender deserves, indeed demands, a second 
and third look, despite, or even because of, its stubborn resistance 
to easy categorization.  If we can read Illich in a way that is consis­
tent with our deepest convictions about equality, dignity, auton­
omy, and the way that men and women interact in the day-to-day 
world, his work could inform legal doctrinal changes.  His novel 
concepts, like “shadow work,”3 “counterproductivity,”4 and “ver­
nacular gender,”5 in particular, may well suggest new solutions to 
old, stubborn problems like the systemic devaluation of the home­
making labor in family law and other areas. We certainly need a 
way to show lawyers, judges, legislators, and policymakers the value 
* Carole & Hanan Sibel Research Professor, University of Maryland Francis 
King Carey Law School.  Many thanks to Jennifer Levi and Erin Buzuvis for convening 
the Illich Symposium, to the editors of the Western New England Law Review for able 
editing, to Shannon Minter and other members of the feminist legal theory reading 
group for enriching my understanding of Illich’s views, to the Thurgood Marshall Law 
Library for research support, and to the Carey Law School at the University of Mary­
land for financial support of this project and other interdisciplinary scholarship. 
1. IVAN ILLICH, GENDER (1982). 
2. Symposium, Beyond the Backlash: A Feminist Critique of Ivan Illich’s Theory 
of Gender, 3 FEMINIST ISSUES 2 (1983). 
3. ILLICH, supra note 1, at 45-46. 
4. Id. at 15-17. 
5. Id. at 67-89. 
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406 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
of day-to-day cooking, cleaning, and help with homework that sus­
tains millions of families, and thus, children and society more 
generally.6 
Illich’s approach is magisterial and absolutely unapologetic. 
But bluster alone is not enough.  The job of grand theories like law 
and economics and postmodernism is to both explain the world as it 
is and predict how it can and should look in the future. We test a 
theory’s explanatory and predictive power by applying it, checking 
for any weak points by poking, prodding, and even slamming it 
against the wall, like the ape in the 1970 American Tourister lug­
gage commercials who demonstrated a suitcase’s strength by stomp­
ing on it.7  If an idea can survive that kind of beating, it can carry 
solutions to the problems that law must address.  Consider this Ar­
ticle such a test. 
I start within Illich’s worldview.  Like Gender, this Article 
adopts a profoundly essentialist, sweeping approach, drawing on a 
range of literatures and periods of history.  He presents an image of 
men, women, and society, inviting, or even commanding, that we 
look to see if it reflects what we see in families.  But looking into 
Illich’s depiction produces, for me, a mirror image, the very oppo­
site of his.  Where he condemns exchange for undermining gender, 
burdening women with shadow work, and robbing both men and 
women of coherent social organization and their very humanity, my 
own research about love and contracts reveals that exchange cre­
ated the world of gender.  Reciprocal exchanges, from the very 
dawn of humanity, have served to facilitate, not undermine, gender, 
family, and social organization.  They enabled our very evolution 
from hairy bipeds to modern humans uniquely able, among all spe­
cies, to write, read, and argue about books like Gender, not to men­
tion invent the internet and root for a favorite contestant in 
Dancing with the Stars.8 
My dance with this intellectual star draws heavily on a book 
project of my own, titled Love & Contracts.9  Like Illich, I put ex­
change at the center of my analysis and also seek to protect what is 
6. See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 
NW. U. L. REV. 1, 21 (1996). See generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: 
WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000). 
7. 1971 American Tourist “Gorilla” Commercial, YOUTUBE (May 19, 2010), http:/ 
/www.youtube.com/watch?v=8C-e96m4730. 
8. Dancing With the Stars (An ABC television broadcast). 
9. MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE & CONTRACTS: THE HEART OF THE  DEAL 
(2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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407 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
most dear to us, from relationships to social organization outside 
families.  Like Illich, I worry about the disproportionate cost borne 
by women who perform mountains of shadow work.  But while he 
sees exchange in domestic relationships as unique to the industrial 
West, and inherently dehumanizing and subordinating, I argue for 
exchange as a foundational building block for forming families, and, 
indeed, a central factor in our evolution through pre-history, al­
lowing us to survive and even thrive through millennia scraping by 
in subsistence living before the advent of central heating and gro­
cery stores (not to mention plumbing, roads, and Penicillin). To­
day, exchanges still help us every day to create, sustain, mend, and 
even, when necessary, end family relationships. 
My book Love & Contracts,10 like Illich’s work, invites readers 
to think about old, familiar ideas and relationships in new ways. 
Primarily, I hope to convince readers that families—seemingly sites 
of the most selfless, unconditional love—are also, at their very 
foundation, grounded in mutual exchanges.  If you are like most 
people, this view runs aground on your strongest intuitions, which 
treat family love as unconditional. Love & Contracts includes 
memoir chapters about having a baby with a gay friend, and then, 
when the child is still in diapers, meeting the woman I will marry, 
who becomes a third parent in our extraordinary family. The book 
is, in large part, my thank you note for this grand gift.  I cannot 
define love, of course, but, but I do try to show love’s power.  Like 
any gift exchange, getting love inspires reciprocation, just as the 
gifts of a strong body and a good mind call you to “give back” by 
putting your particular talents to good use. Family love, I argue, 
calls for back and forth exchanges, day-in and day-out. 
Like Illich, I up-end common assumptions.  And like him, I 
have come up with some new terms to help readers understand my 
new take on old standard views of family.  Old, familiar language 
tends, unfortunately, to lead us to think in old, familiar ways, nar­
rowing our thoughts.  I offer a new vantage point on families by 
using two distinctions that reveal the symbiotic relationship be­
tween love and contracts: (1) “contracts” and “deals”; and (2) “or­
dinary” and “extraordinary” families. 
The first distinction I offer is between “contracts” and “deals.” 
“Contract” is a legal term of art to describe the kind of agreement 
courts enforce.11  You “contract” to buy a car or rent a vacation 
10. Id. 
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). 
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408 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
apartment, which means that if you do not pay, the dealership or 
condominium owner can sue you.  But courts will not enforce some 
agreements, like illegal drug deals, or a husband’s promise to pay 
his wife $50,000 if he cheats on her again.12  I call these non-binding 
agreements “deals,” and argue that they shape our lives even 
though they are not legally binding.  What matters is that deals, like 
contracts, are voluntary and reciprocal exchanges.  Both contracts 
and deals create and sustain families: contracts for renting an apart­
ment, mortgages, joint credit cards, and beneficiary designations on 
retirement accounts, just for starters, and deals like agreeing that 
one will be a full-time mom or dad while the other engages in wage 
labor to support the family.13  Those exchanges, day-in and day-out, 
provide a way to act out being an “us” with your boyfriend, girl­
friend, husband, wife, and kids—not to mention your parents, 
brothers, sisters, and anyone else you consider “family.”  Not tit-
for-tat, exactly, nor a pure, unreciprocated gift, but something in 
between the two that contains both self-interest and generosity.14 
By looking at both non-binding contracts and more informal deals, 
I hope to pull back the curtain wrapped around families that makes 
their give and take look like pure gifts instead of mutual exchanges, 
explain why exchanges build relationships, and, finally, show how 
recognizing the key role of exchanges in our love lives can improve 
family law as well as family life. 
I also distinguish between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” 
families.  Seeing the exchanges underlying all kinds of families 
makes it easier to see the many differences among families as mor­
ally neutral variations.  What matters most is connection through 
exchange, not the particular form the connection. Therefore, I talk 
12. Id. §§ 17, 71, 178; Diosdado v. Diosdado, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (Cal. App. 
2002). 
13. See PAULA  SZUCHMAN & JENNY  ANDERSON, SPOUSONOMICS: USING  ECO­
NOMICS TO  MASTER  LOVE, MARRIAGE, AND  DIRTY  DISHES 24 (2011); Lois Smith 
Brady, State of the Unions: No Tethering, and It’s All Good, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, 
at Style 17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/fashion/weddings/26unions. 
html (quoting singer Judy Collins’ description of her marriage to Louis Nelson: “I cook, 
he washes up . . . .  Sometimes it’s just as basic as that . . .”). 
14. Economic sociologist Viviana Zelizer expertly charts the vast territory lying 
between the extremes of self-interested transactions and altruistic intimate relation­
ships, giving examples like engagement rings and support agreements, demonstrating 
the complex ways that economic exchanges and intimacy interact. See generally VI­
VIANA A. ZELIZER, ECONOMIC LIVES: HOW CULTURE SHAPES THE ECONOMY (2011); 
VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE  PRICELESS  CHILD (1985); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, 
THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF 
MONEY (1994). 
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409 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
about “ordinary” and “extraordinary” families instead of “tradi­
tional” and “unconventional” families to displace assumptions that 
form matters more than the function of families to connect.  Ordi­
nary families are the most common: married, straight, raising kids 
they conceived at home.  Family law sets its default rules based on 
the assumption that most people fall into these categories.  But 
sometimes luck, law, or biology pushes people toward Plan B, lead­
ing them to live together instead of marrying, form same-sex un­
ions, and/or have kids through reproductive technologies or 
adoption.  These Plan B families are best described as “extraordi­
nary” because they’re literally out of the ordinary.  A type of family 
can change from being “extraordinary” to “ordinary,” as when, in 
1967, the Supreme Court designated interracial couples as legally 
ordinary after Mildred and Richard Loving successfully challenged 
Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law.15  Today, same sex couples who 
can marry in states like Massachusetts and Iowa are making same-
sex couples more legally ordinary, though, as of this writing, we re­
main extraordinary under federal law.16 
I hope, by calling families “ordinary” or “extraordinary,” to 
help family law, and society more generally, to finally shake off out­
dated views that some families are natural while others are unnatu­
ral.  What’s natural, I have come to believe, is the human desire to 
connect.  Exchanges, big and small, sustain that connection, day in 
and day out, in all kinds of families.  Connection is such a primal 
need that people go to great lengths to cobble together a Plan B 
way to connect when Plan A doesn’t work out. 
We will always have some extraordinary families, because all 
crucial functions have back-ups.  The ordinary way down from the 
25th floor is an elevator, but stairs serve the same function when 
the power goes out.  Parents ordinarily put their kids to bed, but 
babysitters pitch in when parents go out or work late. Family law 
should recognize different kinds of families—ordinary and ex­
traordinary—to honor the importance of connection in the lives of 
the men, women, and children in those families, and also in society 
more generally. 
15. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
16. Goodridge v. Dept. Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Varnum v. 
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738(C) (2010).  The federal government has ceased defending DOMA, but still en­
forces it.  Marc Ambinder, Obama Won’t Go to Court Over Defense of Marriage Act, 
NAT’L JOURNAL, Feb. 23, 2011. 
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410 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
My terminology, recognizing the deep structural similarity be­
tween contracts and deals, and comparing “ordinary” and “ex­
traordinary” families, helps reveal the many exchanges that shape 
families, and also the way that those exchanges, by definition, vary, 
producing different kinds of families.  All of these families exist to 
address our fundamental human need to connect.  Illich might well 
have approved of this focus on connection and cooperation as first 
principles, given his eloquent support for conviviality.17 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  First, it describes Illich’s 
allergy to exchange as the agent that replaced households defined 
by vernacular gender with married pairs in “inhumane”18 sex-neu­
tral economic partnerships.  Second, it challenges Illich’s view of 
exchange as a destroyer that has meddled in families for only a few 
hundred years.19  I use sociobiological literature to counter his case 
against exchange with one valorizing two exchanges that I call “pri­
mal deals” that played crucial roles in the evolution of humans, 
families, and day-to-day life.  Third, it contends that primal deals— 
especially the primal pair-bonding deal between men and women— 
continue to play a central role in families and family law today. Fi­
nally, this Article concludes by proposing a change in family law to 
reflect the contractual nature of families by allowing spouses to 
contract out of the primal deal, but at the same time recognize that 
those prenuptial agreements effectively cancel the primal deal be­
tween spouses.  Accordingly, courts enforcing prenuptial agree­
ments should also compensate the spouses who gave up property 
sharing rights in the prenuptial agreements for the hours, months, 
and years spent making and sustaining the home and family. 
I. ILLICH’S ALLERGY TO EXCHANGE 
Illich’s critique of exchange in domestic arrangements is closely 
linked to his larger critique of industrial capitalism, and indeed, ec­
onomic growth.  Only negative economic growth policies, he warns, 
can “reduce sexism” and create “peace between men and wo­
men.”20  Contrary to conventional wisdom, he argues that protect­
ing “equal rights,” and seeing marriage as a partnership, may give 
“a sense of accomplishment to the elites who proposed and ob­
tained them, but [leave] the majority of women untouched, if not 
17. See generally IVAN ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY (Harper & Row 1973). 
18. ILLICH, supra note 1, at 76. 
19. Id. at 4, 11-13. 
20. Id. at 15-16. 
32073-w
ne_34-2 S
heet N
o. 40 S
ide A
      08/21/2012   07:54:18
32073-wne_34-2 Sheet No. 40 Side A      08/21/2012   07:54:18
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-2\WNE205.txt unknown Seq: 7 13-AUG-12 9:22
R
 
411 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
worse off than before.”21  Illich makes numerous and complex argu­
ments to prove these grand assertions.  Nevertheless, without too 
much over-simplification, we can distill his main argument into 
three main points: (1) gender is uniquely human and beneficial; (2) 
exchange destroys gender; and, consequently, (3) exchange dehu­
manizes us by replacing vibrant gendered households with sex-neu­
tral economic partnerships.22 Each of these points merits brief 
elaboration. 
A. Gender is Uniquely Human and Beneficial 
Illich defines sex and gender idiosyncratically. While many 
feminists see gender as the social or cultural aspect of biological 
sex,23 Illich presents gender as more innate, and sex, which he dubs 
“economic sex,” as socially constructed.24  “[O]ne is born and bred 
into gender,” he tells us, while “the sex role is something ac­
quired.”25  Gender, which he calls “vernacular gender,” is, in his 
view, “substantive,” like being either a square or a circle.26  He de­
fines “sex” as “the sex of economic neuters,” and sees it as a “mod­
ern experiment to deny or transcend” gender.27  Gender, in this 
view, is intimately bound up with our humanity, and therefore, in 
family structure and function.28 
“Kinship,” he explains, “is possible only between what we con­
ceive as men and women; it only specifies the fit between gendered 
people . . . .  They fit like the right fits the left.”29  This fit, like right 
and left hands, does not, Illich clarifies, mean that the left hand is in 
any way inferior, as people used say as they forced left-handed chil­
dren to become right-handed.30  The complementarity of left and 
right, for Illich, protected women, as well as men, for most of 
21. Id. at 16-17. 
22. Id. at 74, 76, 168 n.120. 
23. See, e.g., SIMONE DE  BEAUVOIR, THE  SECOND  SEX (H.M. Parshley, trans. 
Vintage Books 1974).  Other feminists see only culture, with sex being one social con­
struction, and gender another. See, e.g., JUDITH  BUTLER, BODIES  THAT  MATTER 
(1993); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990). 
24. ILLICH, supra note 1, at 14 n.7. 
25. Id. at 81.  Though initially it seems that Illich has simply reversed the conven­
tional view of gender as cultural and sex as biological, he explicitly resists this simple 
mapping, contending that “[b]oth gender and sex are social realities with only a tenuous 
connection to anatomy.” Id. at 14 n.7. 
26. Id. at 80-81. 
27. Id. at 74, 80-81. 
28. See id. at 67-68, 81. 
29. Id. at 70. 
30. Id. at 71. 
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412 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
human history, all those many millennia while our ancestors lived in 
subsistence, pre-industrial communities.  In a subsistence society, 
unlike prior to our own “push-button society,” he contends, “[e]ach 
man and woman . . . depends for survival on the interplay of two 
hands.”31  Men and women performed different tasks, and still do 
in some places, he explains, citing wide-ranging ethnographies and 
other literature on pre-capitalist communities.32  “In one valley of 
the Alps,” he tells us, men and women meet on the threshing floor, 
“he with the flail and she with the sieve,”33 while in a Dijon village 
women choose which pig will be slaughtered, and address it as 
“Monsieur,” but the men “set the day for the slaughter.”34  Men do 
men’s work, in short, and women do women’s work, though pre­
cisely which tasks get assigned to men or women varies greatly 
across communities.35  What seems to matter most to Illich is the 
community-centered coordination of male and female labor.36  He 
sees it as undergirding the dominant domestic institution, the 
household, which in turn mediated relationships “between the indi­
vidual and the village community, not the twosome, the parents, the 
couple.”37  These patterns survived for millennia, he contends, giv­
ing way only in the wake of economic thinking.38 
B. Economic Exchange Destroys Gender 
According to Illich, that economic, exchange-oriented view of 
interactions with people, the land, and communities destroyed gen­
der, and at the same time, deprived us of an essential element of 
our humanity.39  By inventing the idea of scarcity, he contends, eco­
nomic thinking encouraged economic exchange to manage pur­
ported scarcity, dethroning gender as an organizing principle for 
daily life, social organization, and our very humanity.40  In Illich’s 
view, this change demoted us from fully human, gendered men and 
women to vastly inferior genderless individuals: “for me, what is 
unique about Homo sapiens as a human phenomenon is the con­
stant incarnation of the symbolic duality of gender . . . . 
31. Id. at 72. 
32. Id. 106-09 (providing literature on different cultures). 
33. Id. at 106. 
34. Id. at 108. 
35. Id. at 108, 110, 113-14. 
36. Id. at 109. 
37. Id. at 109-10. 
38. Id. at 111. 
39. See id. at 76 n.57. 
40. Id. 
32073-w
ne_34-2 S
heet N
o. 41 S
ide A
      08/21/2012   07:54:18
32073-wne_34-2 Sheet No. 41 Side A      08/21/2012   07:54:18
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-2\WNE205.txt unknown Seq: 9 13-AUG-12 9:22
413 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
[G]enderless modern humans behave almost as apes.”41  The culprit 
for our degeneration from humane gender to “inhumane” sex, ac­
cording to Illich, is “commodity-intensive industrial society”42 fu­
eled by individualism.  Illich views individualism—the view of us as 
gender-neutral humans—as the lynchpin of a worldview centered 
on exchange.43  It created industrialization, which, he contends, 
supplanted good values like “decency,” “protect[ing] the weakest 
from ruin,” and respect between men and women.44  In their stead, 
industrialization gave us only the isolated rights of individuals, and 
permitted men and women to do the same work.45  Doing the same 
work as individuals, he reasons, has turned out to be a lousy deal 
for women.  It has led men in industrial economies to engage more 
intensely in wage labor, and leaves women to perform an immense 
amount of what Illich calls “shadow work,” like servicing the car 
(and paying insurance on it) so she can drive to grocery stores, 
where she will buy food that she will prepare and clean up at 
home.46  This “shadow work,” according to Illich, “constitutes an 
economic activity on which the cash flow, salaries, and surplus value 
for capital formation all ultimately depend.”47  Rather than produce 
significant value, shadow work consumes time and energy, endlessly 
depletes women and their spirits.48  In sum, Illich up-ends conven­
tional assertions that individualism and gender-neutrality is better 
for women than pre-industrial gender duality, arguing that eco­
nomic individualism paradoxically produces the opposite result: a 
new class of human being, de-gendered women, treated, for the first 
time, as a second sex. 
His genealogy of this demise runs back to the sixteenth cen­
tury.49  Illich, a Catholic priest, lays the blame squarely on the 
shoulders of the Protestant Reformation, naming Martin Luther as 
“the true inventor of the modern doctrine that there is something 
inherently dignified and praise-worthy about labor, that the man 
who bears the burden in the heat of the day is somehow more 
41. Id. at 76. 
42. Id. at 76, 94. 
43. Id. at 10. 
44. Id. at 111, 116. 
45. Id. at 50. 
46. See id. at 45 n.30. 
47. Id. at 55. 
48. See id. at 57. 
49. Id. at 23. 
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414 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
pleasing to God than the man who takes his ease in the shade.”50 
That misconception, according to Illich, laid the groundwork for 
what Illich describes as “the slow establishment of wage labor as 
the prototype of work that should be dignified, gratifying, meaning­
ful, and accessible to all.”51  In typical contrarian style, he turns this 
view of independence bought with market labor on its head by 
describing living off wages as “not . . . simple poverty but . . . 
misery.”52 
C.	 Exchange Replaced Vibrant Gendered Households with Sex-
Neutral Economic Partnerships 
Illich’s remedy, it seems, is to reinstate, or at least valorize, re­
gendering women’s and men’s work to remedy women’s current 
second-class citizenship.  Only if households of men and women re­
turn to living as two complementary genders, performing gendered 
tasks for their community, can we escape today’s marriages made 
up of men and women acting “almost as apes”53 as they mechani­
cally enact a “genderless economic partnership between a wage la­
borer and a shadow worker.”54  We will achieve true equality 
between men and women, he argues, only when we abandon the 
fiction of gender-neutrality that underlies an individualist-centered, 
economic-growth oriented society.55  This change, far from being 
backward, in his view, would correct a brief and misguided detour 
away from gender, and reassert gender to correct the “profound 
discontinuity” he sees “between all past forms of existence and 
Western individualism.”56  Only valuing work that is gendered, it 
seems, can correct the degradation of women that Illich attributes 
to gender’s demise.57 
There is a lot to like about what Illich says. First, his concept 
of “shadow work” gives name to the avalanche of petty tasks that 
we perform to keep twenty-first century households running—pay­
ing bills, registering cars, making doctor’s appointments, let alone 
navigating phone trees to make those appointments—that, to­
50. Id. at 23 n.13 (quoting H.L. MENCKEN, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE: AN IN­
QUIRY INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH IN THE UNITED STATES (1980)). 
51.	 Id. 
52.	 Id. 
53.	 Id. at 76. 
54.	 Id. at 168 n.120. 
55.	 Id. at 10 n.5. 
56.	 Id. 
57. Id. at 126 (“[T]he loss of gender does and must degrade women even more 
than men.”). 
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415 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
gether, threaten to overwhelm even the most patient of us.58  Sec­
ond, I agree with him that Protestant ideas played a key role in 
investing individuals with the power to shape their lives, which 
ushered in our current idealized view of marriage as a partnership 
among purported equals.59  Third, he is properly names the persis­
tence of gender inequality despite decades of legal and cultural at­
tempts to treat men and women as if they were gender-neutral 
citizens. 
But he and I differ in diagnosing the cause of the disconnect 
between our contemporary rhetoric of formal equality and the lived 
experience of men and women that results in too many women 
working an uncompensated second shift on household labor, and 
too narrow a view of what constitutes a family. Where Illich 
charges exchange with the crime of dethroning gender, and usher­
ing in an inhumane sex-neutral regime that, nevertheless, values 
men and masculinity more than women and femininity,60 I see ex­
change as the very foundation of our humanity, gender, our fami­
lies, and the various arrangements that people have long made in 
different ways in different times and places to keep body and soul 
together. 
II.	 GENDER, HOUSEHOLDS, AND FAMILIES BROUGHT TO 
US BY EXCHANGE 
Without exchange there would be no gender and no families. 
Indeed, according to some anthropological research, we would not 
exist as human beings.  Millions of years ago, before courts, law­
yers, governments, or even language, our proto-human ancestors 
entered two kinds of exchanges that changed everything.  I call both 
“primal deals” because these exchanges functioned as fundamental, 
primeval engines of family and social organization.61 
58. Craig Lambert, Opinion, Our Unpaid, Extra Shadow Work, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
30, 2011, at SR12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/opinion/sunday/our­
unpaid-extra-shadow-work.html?pagewanted=all. 
59. See generally JOHN  WITTE, JR., FROM  SACRAMENT TO  CONTRACT: MAR­
RIAGE, RELIGION, AND THE LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (Don S. Browning & Ian 
S. Evison, eds., 1997). 
60. ILLICH, supra note 1, at 76. 
61. 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 471 (2d ed. 1991) (defining primal as 
“[b]elonging to the first age or earliest stage; original, . . . primitive, primeval . . . . 
Relating or pertaining to such needs, fears, behaviour, etc., as form the origins of emo­
tional life, esp. as in Freud’s theory”; as well as “Of first rank, standing, or importance; 
chief, . . . fundamental, essential”). 
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416 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
The first exchange, sometimes known as the “sex contract” in 
anthropological literature,62 is a primal deal between men and wo­
men to form a pair bond.  According to sociobiologists63 like E.O. 
Wilson, women exchanged sexual exclusivity and foraged food for 
men’s bounty from the hunt and a bit of protection and help with 
the children.  The deal served the larger goal of getting their genes 
to the next generation, which many sociobiologists see as the funda­
mental goal of every action taken by humans, every other species, 
and life itself.64 
The second primal deal has more recently come to light in 
work by evolutionary scholars like anthropologist Sarah Blaffer 
Hrdy and psychologist Shelley Taylor.  Hrdy and Taylor focus on 
different questions—Hrdy as a primatologist, and Taylor as a social 
psychologist—but both document, in ancient as well as contempo­
rary cultures, exchanges among women—often mothers—to help 
raise their children and care for other close intimates.65  These two 
primal deals—pair bonding and tending—together enabled us to 
evolve into a species apart.  More importantly, those primal deals 
continue to define key features of family life, and therefore, appro­
priately serve as a backbone for family law. The reciprocal ex­
change at the heart of the first deal, pair bonding between men and 
women, may well explain why legal rules have long described mar­
riage as a civil contract.66 
62. See generally HELEN E. FISHER, THE  SEX  CONTRACT: THE  EVOLUTION OF 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1982); SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHERS & OTHERS 147 (2009). 
63. Illich, to be fair, would likely dismiss these sociobiological arguments as inher­
ently sexist and racist. ILLICH, supra note 1, at 75-79.  Nevertheless, sociobiology seems 
hardly to have faded as the “academic fad” Illich charges it with being.  Instead, it now 
includes feminists like Sarah Blaffer Hrdy and Shelley Taylor, who demonstrate that 
evolutionary biology and psychology can uncover complementities between genders of 
the sort Illich valorizes. 
64. See generally RICHARD  DAWKINS, THE  SELFISH  GENE (3d ed. 2006); E.O. 
WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE (rev. ed. 2004). 
65. While men participate in what Taylor calls “tending” exchanges, they are 
more often on the receiving end of care than the giving end. 
66. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 433 (1884).  Family law, of course, 
has changed greatly since Blackstone.  In the eighteenth century, the common law 
treated women and children as essentially property of men, subject to the control and 
discipline of the man of their household.  Over the past 150 years, however, family law 
rules have changed to treat women and children as more fully human, for example, by 
recognizing wives’ rights to contract and own property, protecting women and children 
from domestic violence, and also treating fathers of non-marital children as legal fa­
thers. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating 
Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994); Joseph Warren, Hus­
band’s Right to Wife’s Services, 38 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1925).  Accordingly, I make no 
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417 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
A. Pair Bonding between Men and Women 
Millions of years ago, anthropologist Helen Fisher tells us, our 
apelike ancestor began “the most fundamental exchange the human 
race would ever make.”67  Our hairy fore-mothers, she explains, 
spent their days collecting edible roots and other vegetables, while 
their male counterparts ranged over wider territory looking for a 
rabbit or mongoose to eat.68  But while their ancestors had mated 
freely, these proto-humans gradually formed pair bonds structured 
by an exchange.  A female would focus her sexual and grooming 
attention on one male, and share her foraged vegetables with him, 
while he, in turn, would share his proceeds from the hunt. Whether 
these relationships lasted a few months, a year, or a lifetime, they 
were reciprocal.  She expected a share of meat brought back from 
hunting, and he expected a share of “her” vegetables.  Outsiders 
got only surplus.  Gradually, he also began to protect her from dan­
gers like other animals.69  Little by little, over thousands of years, 
men in his position extended their efforts beyond sharing food, and 
also began to help feed and protect the young. Those actions, like 
coaching little ones about what foods were safe to eat, and helping 
out when they were sick or sad,70 transformed those children from 
“hers” into “theirs.” 
E.O. Wilson, often called the father of sociobiology,71 also sees 
this reciprocal exchange as central to human families, allowing us to 
evolve to our current state with large, complex brains that produce 
language and cooperation unseen in other mammals.72  These male-
female pair bonds helped greatly in raising young who start out ab­
solutely helpless and do not become self-sufficient for more than 
ten years.73  With pair bonding, women could bear four times as 
many children as they would otherwise, giving natural selection 
four times as many people from whom to select the genes of the 
claim that the ancient provenance of the primal deals I discuss has produced identical 
legal rules over time and place.  Such a claim would be patently false. 
67. FISHER, supra note 62, at 94. 
68. Id. at 99. 
69. Id. at 100. 
70. Id. 
71. Herma Hill Kay, Perspectives on Sociobiology, Feminism, and the Law, in 
THEORETICAL  PERSPECTIVES ON  SEXUAL  DIFFERENCE 76 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 
1990). 
72. FISHER, supra note 62, at 102; WILSON, supra note 64, 123, 139. 
73. HRDY, supra note 62, at 101. 
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418 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
smartest, fastest, strongest, and most cooperative to convey to fu­
ture generations.74 
Moreover, those smarts are costly.  A human infant, then 
child’s, brain requires phenomenally high caloric intake, which in 
turn requires cooperation among people to collect enough food to 
get a child to reproductive age, when he or she can start the cycle 
again.75  As Wilson explains, that slow, expensive breeding gave our 
ancestors who could strike deals with one another a leg up in get­
ting their genes to the next generation: 
Human beings, as typical large primates, breed slowly.  Mothers 
carry fetuses for nine months and afterward are encumbered by 
infants and small children who require milk at frequent intervals 
through the day.  It is to the advantage of each woman of the 
hunter-gatherer band to secure the allegiance of men who will 
contribute meat and hides while sharing the labor of child-rear­
ing.  It is to the reciprocal advantage of each man to obtain exclu­
sive sexual rights to women and to monopolize their economic 
productivity.  If the evidence from hunter-gatherer life has been 
correctly interpreted, the exchange has resulted in near universal­
ity of the pair bond and the prevalence of extended families with 
men and their wives forming the nucleus.76 
In this view, genes need a lot more than bare reproduction to get to 
the next generation.  Flirting, courting, and the elaborate social 
rituals—from love songs to designating appropriate gifts for partic­
ular wedding anniversaries77—facilitate and support the pair bond 
exchange that increases the chance of each child maturing to repro­
ductive age, and starting the cycle again.78 
Two aspects of this story undermine Illich’s charge that ex­
change dehumanizes men and women.  First, it shows that male 
contributions in the pair-bonding primal deal made it possible for 
us to become gendered humans in the first place. While mothers in 
74. FISHER, supra note 62, at 102. 
75. HRDY, supra note 62, at 146 (“No creature in the world (unless, just possibly, 
a bowhead whale) takes longer to mature than a human child does.  Nor does any other 
creature need so much for so long before his acquisition and production of resources 
matches his consumption.”). 
76. WILSON, supra note 64, at 139 (emphasis added). 
77. Emily Post codified the appropriate anniversary gifts: paper for the first anni­
versary, and so on, up to silver for the twenty-fifth wedding anniversary, and gold for 
the fiftieth, or golden, wedding anniversary. EMILY  POST, ETIQUETTE IN  SOCIETY, IN 
BUSINESS, IN POLITICS AND AT HOME 378 (1922). 
78. WILSON, supra note 64, at 141; see also DAWKINS, supra note 64, for an ex­
tended argument that all human activities, indeed all activities of all species, are aimed 
to get their genes to the next generation. 
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419 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
nearly all mammalian species care for young,79 the pair bond vastly 
increases human fathers’ contributions toward their young, far 
above other species.  Most other high primate fathers are deadbeat 
dads, absent at best.  In some species, fathers get credit for resisting 
the temptation to eat their young. The very singularity of human 
male willingness to exchange the scarce resources of time, food, and 
energy for sexual exclusivity and a share of gathered roots and veg­
etables played a tremendous role in making us the big-brained, 
talking, writing, cooperative species that engages in the type of 
elaborate social rituals of gender division that Illich valorizes. 
Second, the pair bonding exchange enables elaborate human 
cultures to form.  Our distant ancestors began to cooperate in pair 
bonds over a million years ago.  Bit by bit, over millennia, they de­
veloped reciprocal exchange networks, first within families, then 
between families, and, eventually, so different from other species,80 
even among strangers.  This last stage, exchange among strangers, 
defines human society for Wilson: 
Reciprocation among distantly related or unrelated individuals is 
the key to human society.  The perfection of the social contract 
has broken the ancient vertebrate constraints imposed by rigid 
kin selection.  Through the convention of reciprocation, com­
bined with a flexible, endlessly productive language and a genius 
for verbal classification, human beings fashion long-remembered 
agreements upon which cultures and civilizations can be built.81 
In other words, the pair-bonding primal deal paved the way for eve­
ryone’s family, and also the more general human evolution that al­
lows me to write, and you to read, this Article, as well as much 
grander efforts like creating democracies, eradicating polio, build­
ing the Pantheon, and organizing flash mobs. 
Helen Fisher, alongside sociobiologists like Richard Dawkins, 
treat sex as the central focus of the pair bond,82 a myopia that E.O. 
Wilson and other “Harvard School” sociobiologists83 remedy some­
what to consider the many social rituals that facilitate and support 
pair bonding.  But even Wilson leaves a huge part of the story in the 
shadows.  The primal pair bonding exchange is about more than 
just sex.  You do not have to be a biologist to know that human 
79. HRDY, supra note 62, at 39. 
80. Id. at 1-3. 
81. WILSON, supra note 64, at 158. 
82. DAWKINS, supra note 64, at 161; FISHER, supra note 62, at 99. 
83. HRDY, supra note 62, at 148-51. 
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420 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
evolution requires reproduction.  But traditional sociobiological in­
sistence that sex and romance are enough to get your genes to the 
next generation undervalues the hours, days, weeks, months, and 
years of work it takes to shepherd babies from infancy through 
childhood and young adulthood so they, too, can become parents.84 
That myopia produces significant distortions by viewing human in­
teractions as, at core, kill-or-be-killed contests for survival.  Men 
battle other men for access to fertile women.  Parents ration food 
and protection, giving children only enough to ensure that the par­
ents’ genes will get to the next generation, and playing favorites if 
one child seems more likely than others to survive to adulthood and 
continue the reproductive cycle.  Dawkins’s version of the battle of 
the sexes is even fiercer, with fathers and mothers each trying to 
“cheat” each other by skimping on their children, so that each can, 
in Dawkins’s words, “have more to spend on other children by 
other sexual partners, and so propagate more of his genes.”85 
Evolutionary biology evolves, like the organisms it studies, 
making room for new research that has corrected significant defects 
in Sociobiology 1.0.  Wilson sees pair bonding, which includes, but 
is not limited to, sex, as the main event.86  That pair bonding, Wil­
son reasons, keeps the male around to help out, which increases the 
chance of both adults and children surviving, and also of children 
growing up and passing on their genes to the next generation.87  But 
like many men, Wilson spends much more time talking about 
sports, hunting, and other forms of aggression than about the ad­
mittedly prosaic food sanitation, meal preparation, and child care 
required to ensure a gene’s survival in coming generations.  Only 
when female researchers like Shelley Taylor and Sarah Blaffer 
Hrdy joined the scholarly dialog did the focus expand more fully to 
encompass another primal deal, between mothers and other, usu­
ally female, caretakers. 
B. The Primal Deal among Mothers and Others 
Scientists have demonstrated that it takes a village to raise a 
child, consistent with the popular saying.  Hrdy focuses on our pri­
mate ancestors, documenting a primal deal among female 
caregivers that, she argues, greatly aided human evolution by al­
84. Id. at 46-47. 
85. DAWKINS, supra note 64, at 140. 
86. WILSON, supra note 64, at 139-40. 
87. Id. 
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421 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
lowing mothers to have children spaced just a few years apart.88 
Since our children are dependent on their parents longer than most 
other species—unlike foals, say, who stand up minutes after being 
born—our survival to adulthood generally requires at least ten 
years of daily, hourly, and sometimes even minute-by-minute 
care.89  Hrdy acknowledges the power of male-female pair bonds in 
evolution, but asserts that the pair-bonding deal accompanied a 
deal that, she contends, was even more central to our evolution. 
Like Illich and me, she coins a new vocabulary to make this revolu­
tionary point.  She uses the term “alloparents” to describe the 
adults and older children with whom mothers exchange childcare 
protection, and food gathering and preparation that give children 
the roughly thirteen million calories necessary to bring them to ma­
turity.90 These alloparents—literally meaning other-parents—Hrdy 
asserts, played an instrumental role in human evolution: 
Few animals are born needier or remain dependent longer than 
humans.  At some point in our distant past, care and provisioning 
from alloparents began to permit human mothers to breed at a 
faster pace than any ape ever before . . . . Without help from 
others, such children could not survive.91 
Alloparenting, also known as cooperative breeding, sets humans 
apart from most other primates.92 
High ape mothers tend to hold their babies continually for the 
first year or more until they are weaned, not even allowing the fa­
ther to hold them, but human mothers get help from the outset.93 
Mothers had to develop extraordinary skills in reading the thoughts 
and feelings of others so they could be sure they were entrusting the 
baby or child with someone trustworthy.  Babies, in turn, evolved to 
charm those caretakers with babbling, smiling, and other socially-
bonding interactions that only humans and the very few coopera­
tively breeding primates exhibit.94  Little by little, in a process that 
took some two million years, these crucial skills became part of the 
88. SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHER NATURE 201-02 (1999). 
89. Id. 
90. HRDY, supra note 62, at 140. 
91. Id. 
92. Only about 3% of mammals, and 9% of “roughly 10,000 species of birds” 
engage in cooperative breeding. Id. at 177. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 122 (noting that only one other primate family, Callitrichidae, pass 
through the babbling stage, and they are among the few cooperative breeding 
primates). 
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422 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
human repertoire as the babies who could best charm caretakers to 
provide for and protect them survived to adulthood, passing on 
those genes and behavioral tricks on to their children.95  Today, 
when we coo back and forth with babies we echo these ancient 
rituals. 
Fathers help out, Hrdy acknowledges.96  But across cultures, 
and across time within each culture, paternal contributions are too 
highly variable to have, alone, produced our huge population, given 
our uniquely expensive, long-dependent offspring.  Some of the al­
loparent deals only can be done among females, like the common 
exchange between lactating mothers in which one breastfeeds the 
other’s children if the mother is away for a while, in exchange for 
the return favor at another time, or babysitting support.97  Like 
many family interactions, alloparenting can take the form of less 
literally tit-for-tat exchange, and also pure gift.  Often, Hrdy ex­
plains, a cycle of seeming gifts look, over time, more like exchanges: 
The people you treat generously this year, with the loan of a tool 
or gift of food, are the same people you depend on next year 
when your waterholes dry up or game in your home range disap­
pears . . . .  Failures to reciprocate would result in loss of allies or, 
worse still, social exclusion.98 
Sometimes the exchanges are more immediate.  A teenage cousin 
helps a mother by babysitting, and, in turn, learns about childcare 
so she will know how to provide for a baby when her time comes. 
This shared care slowly made us who we are.  Back and forth, over 
millennia, the ones who engaged in allomothering exchanges were 
more likely to survive, and pass their genes and behavioral know-
how to the next generation. “Without alloparents,” Hrdy says 
bluntly, “there never would have been a human species.”99 
Shelley Taylor similarly argues for natural selection favoring a 
tending instinct that, while present in both sexes, is particularly 
strong in females.  She demonstrates that taking care of others is as 
natural and biologically based as eating, sleeping, or sex.100  Taylor 
did not set out to study the tending instinct, but stumbled on its 
immense impact in her laboratory studies about the effect of stress 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 151. 
97. Id. at 87, 180. 
98. Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted). 
99. Id. at 109. 
100. SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, THE TENDING INSTINCT: HOW NURTURING IS ESSEN­
TIAL FOR WHO WE ARE AND HOW WE LIVE 10 (2002). 
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423 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
on health.101  She found that good tending reduces stress and its 
emotional, physical, and social toll.102  Bad tending, in turn, like liv­
ing with an alcoholic or in a dangerous neighborhood, increases 
stress, which in turn increases the incidence and severity of disease, 
even shortening life spans.  Along the way, Taylor also came up 
with a new term.  To enrich the “fight or flight” literature, she iden­
tified a second response to stress, which she calls “tend and be­
friend.”103  Females, she explains, are neurochemically programmed 
to respond to stress by first looking around to see if any children 
need to be protected (the “tend” part), and then enlisting other 
adults to help respond to the danger (“befriend”).104  Tending and 
befriending make a huge difference in both everyday life and 
emergencies. 
Neither Hrdy nor Taylor argues that women and men are des­
tined by biology to perform set scripts in which men hunt and wo­
men mind the hearth.  These full professors could not have 
conducted their research at the University of California had they 
been chained to the kitchen table.  But Hrdy and Taylor do docu­
ment, and urge us to value, the huge impact of biological sex 
differences. 
For example, women’s sex drives and breastfeeding are stimu­
lated by an endogenous opiate called oxytocin, which makes people 
more trusting, more interested in nuzzling and protecting infants, 
and less irritable (all helpful when faced with a squalling infant at 
2:00 A.M.).105  Oxytocin also seems to trigger “tend and befriend” 
behavior.  Taylor explains how estrogen, which women have a lot 
of, amplifies the effects of oxytocin.106  While men also have oxyto­
cin, and indeed at least one study shows elevated oxytocin levels in 
men at orgasm, they are less influenced by oxytocin because testos­
terone tamps down its effects.107  These biological differences may 
explain part of why women do more tending.  Even human fathers, 
rock stars though they are compared to other fathers in the animal 
101. Id. at 1-3. 
102. See generally id. at 52-69 (providing several examples of nurturing that led to 
greater emotional, physical, and social health). 
103. Id. at 20-22. 
104. Id. 
105. HELEN E. FISHER, ANATOMY OF  LOVE: THE  NATURAL  HISTORY OF  MO­
NOGAMY, ADULTERY, AND DIVORCE 317 (1992); HRDY, supra note 62, at 169-71. 
106. TAYLOR, supra note 100, at 28. 
107. HRDY, supra note 62, at 170-71 (noting “couvade,” or reductions of testos­
terone in men who live with a pregnant women or care for young children, but that 
these changes are much more dramatic in women); TAYLOR, supra note 100, at 28. 
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424 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
kingdom, still do only about 30% of the work it takes to maintain a 
household and care for kids, leaving women holding the grocery 
bags about 70% of the time.108 
The tending deal works in tandem with the pair-bonding deals. 
Depending on income, parents either pay child care providers or 
rely on help from other mothers, grandmothers, older children, 
cousins, sisters, aunts, or others who may be related to the mother 
through her pair bond with the child’s father.109  All that care—for 
children and whole families —requires scaled-back wage labor. 
Men, on average, contribute more cash, and women, on average, 
contribute more care, though increasingly women earn more.  Over 
their prime earning years, American women earn 38% of men’s 
wages, and mothers, on average, “earn 67 cents for every dollar 
earned by fathers.”110  True, women represent 50% of the Ameri­
can workforce, but they work fewer hours for lower wages, so that 
they only bring home 28%, on average, of the family income.111 
This exchange, money for tending, seems to work well for both men 
and women. 
Marriage improves health, happiness, and economic stability 
more than just about anything else.  However, it is especially bene­
ficial for men, partly because they benefit so greatly from tending 
by their wives.  Men who marry, and stay married, have an over 
90% chance of living past 65, while women’s life expectancy is not 
affected by marriage.112  As Shelley Taylor explains: 
Married men typically get many perks that single men and mar­
ried women do not usually enjoy. For example, depending on the 
marriage, husbands may be fed, clothed, and picked up after, at 
least more so than is true for single men or for women.  Someone 
else very often shops, cooks, cleans the house, does the laundry, 
and may even buy their clothes and do their errands.113 
Married men also, Taylor explains, “eat more nutritious meals . . . 
and are less likely to smoke[,] . . . drink heavily, or abuse illegal 
108. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE  WORK-FAMILY  DEBATE: WHY  MEN 
AND  CLASS  MATTER 23, 82 (2010) (noting that fathers spend one-third to one-half of 
the time mothers do on kids’ enrichment activities like piano lessons; fathers, on aver­
age, spend one hour with children for every three hours mothers spend). This data is 
among American families and may differ in other cultures. 
109. HRDY, supra note 62, at 158. 
110. WILLIAMS, supra note 108, at 26, 33. 
111. Id. 
112. TAYLOR, supra note 100, at 114. 
113. Id. at 114-15. 
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425 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
drugs” than single men.114  The primal deals, in short, are good for 
both men and women.  Men deliver much-needed material support 
for women and children, and women, for their part provide extraor­
dinarily valuable tending that increases longevity and makes daily 
life much easier for everyone in the family.  Like any commercial 
contract, everyone involved both gives and gets something. 
It is important to note that these comparisons of men and wo­
men average out in large populations, so that many women are 
providers for their family, while many men spend time tending. 
One hand-holding study demonstrates the value of tending by hus­
bands.  University of Virginia psychologist James Coan adminis­
tered a mild shock to married women that caused low-level pain.115 
The researchers monitored the women’s’ brains using functional 
MRI imaging technology to measure how social support might re­
duce their experience of stress.  Some of the women experienced 
the shock alone, others holding a stranger’s hand, and a third group 
held their husbands’ hands. The hand holders—both strangers and 
husbands—showed lower neural activity in the part of the brain 
that regulates stress.  But husbands’ hand holding had the biggest 
effect, acting on the brain like a pain-reducing drug.116  Good care, 
an integral part of the pair bonding exchange, is a good deal. To­
gether, the primal deals have the power to protect health, reduce 
distress, improve all kinds of relationships, and even lengthen life. 
To summarize: evolutionary literature supports some of Illich’s 
claims, and refutes others.  In particular: it supports his claims that 
gender, in many ways, constitutes a deep-seated aspect of our hu­
manity that informs daily life and social organization.  However, 
sociobiological research also undermines Illich’s claim that eco­
nomic thinking and exchanges destroyed gender by replacing vi­
brant gendered households with sex-neutral economic 
partnerships.117  Far from undermining gender, primal exchanges 
enabled the formation of gender, and gendered kinship patterns, 
among our distant ancestors.  Only with the primal deals for pair 
bonding and alloparenting could human beings evolve to form Il­
lich’s idealized pre-modern societies and our own post-industrial 
one.  Exchange can hardly be called dehumanizing if it made hu­
114. Id. at 115. 
115. Tara Parker-Pope, Is Marriage Good for your Health?, N.Y. TIMES  MAG., 
Apr. 18, 2010, at 46, 51, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/magazine/18 
marriage-t.html?pagewanted=all. 
116. Id. 
117. ILLICH, supra note 1, at 74, 76, 168. 
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manity possible in the first place. Without primal deals there would 
be no gender, let alone gender complementarity, or recent press for 
the very gender neutrality that Illich abhors. 
Family law rules tend to recognize the pair-bonding primal 
deal, but largely ignores alloparenting deals.  Space constraints pre­
clude exploring whether family law should enforce alloparenting 
agreements as “contracts,” that create familial right and duties, as 
some family law scholars recommend,118 so the discussion here fo­
cuses on a select few family law cases to show how contemporary 
legal doctrine recognizes both sides of the pair-bonding deal unless 
the spouses enter a prenuptial contract that limits property sharing. 
Then, courts tend to let the richer spouse out of his side of the deal, 
but refuse to allow the poorer, care-taking, spouse to alter her du­
ties under the deal.  Family law should evolve to more fully value 
both feminine and masculine sides of the pair-bonding deal. 
Linking Illich’s insights about shadow work with Hrdy’s and 
Taylor’s findings about the tending primal deal shows ways that 
family law could improve to honor both the feminine and masculine 
sides of the primal deals.  While current law reflects a good measure 
of the “hierarchy and dependence”119 that Illich condemns as prod­
ucts of gender neutrality, a fuller recognition of the role of ex­
change in family formation and functioning could alleviate a good 
bit of that hierarchy and dependence. 
III. FAMILY LAW (MOSTLY) HONORS THE PRIMAL DEAL 
Today, family law mostly honors the pair-bonding primal deal 
by treating family property as belonging to both husband and wife 
upon divorce, regardless of who made the money used to acquire 
that property.120  Here, I discuss one aspect of how family law cur­
rently recognizes the pair-bonding deal first by applying a general 
rule that treats earnings during a marriage as joint property, and 
second, by recognizing an exception to that general rule when mod-
ern-day wage-earning spouses contract out of their obligation to 
share the contemporary equivalents of rabbits brought home from 
the range.  Finally, I suggest how family law could extend its recog­
nition of the exchanges that lie at the heart of ordinary families by 
118. Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding 
of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 424-27, 443-44 (2008); see also Laura 
Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47 (2007); Laura A. Rosen­
bury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 231 (2007). 
119. Id. at 76 (emphasis omitted). 
120. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 (1973). 
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427 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
also honoring the value of the feminine tending work done by pri­
mary homemakers when spouses enter a prenuptial agreement. 
A. Legal Rules Mostly Honor the Primal Deal 
The pair-bonding primal deal, in which men work outside the 
home more than women, and women work inside the home more 
than men, continues to shape many, if not most, ordinary families. 
According to Helen Fisher, these patterns are pretty stable across 
time and place.121  Studies consistently show that while most people 
around the world find good complexions and cleanliness attractive, 
“men are attracted to young, good-looking, spunky women, while 
women are drawn to men with goods, property, or money,” 
whether they are rural Zulus, urban Brazilians, or Americans.122 
Along the same lines, a 1997 study by Jean Potuchek reported that 
83% of American women in dual-earner couples, and an even 
higher percentage of the childrearing women, thought that a man 
should be the family’s primary provider.123  Apparently a good 
number of people put these beliefs into action, because women, on 
average, work fewer hours than men, and earn less than men for the 
hours they do work.124  As Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times 
columnist Maureen Dowd observes, the increased equality between 
men and women has not changed social conventions like women 
still expecting men to pay for dinner on a date.125  Indeed, Dowd 
suggests that much as she likes men, she’s never married, because 
“smart men with demanding jobs would rather have old-fashioned 
wives, like their mums, than equals.”126  Case law on marital con­
tracting also suggests that Illich has prematurely announced gen­
der’s death, and, moreover, that the solution to the inequities 
produced by both gender and gender-neutrality may be more, not 
less, legal recognition of the exchanges that create and shape family 
life. 
121. FISHER, supra note 105, at 47. 
122. Id. 
123. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 27. 
124. Id. 
125. MAUREEN  DOWD, ARE  MEN  NECESSARY?: WHEN  SEXES  COLLIDE 37, 47 
(2005). 
126. Id.  This simple pattern holds most true for white Americans. While Afri­
can-American women selecting a mate care even more than their white counterparts 
about a man’s earning power, African-American men also value their would-be-wives’ 
economic stability. RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE? 46-47 
(2011). 
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1. Case Stories 
The remainder of this Article uses four cases to illustrate the 
role of the primal deal in family law.  Like all couples, the couples 
in these cases doubtless struck lots of informal contracts and deals, 
from apartment leases and joint credit cards to deals that one does 
the laundry and the other mows the lawn, but the cases got to court 
because the couples also made formal agreements to keep their 
property separate.  The cases, as a group, reveal the background 
rule of property sharing that prenuptial contracts can alter, and also 
how much the core characteristic of the primal deal—exchange of 
food, care, and sex—remains central to family today.  In the last 
few decades family law has allowed richer spouses—usually, but not 
always, husbands—to “contract out” of their duty to provide eco­
nomic support, but not, strangely, allowed the poorer spouses— 
usually wives—to contract for recognition of their work providing 
meals, medical care, household maintenance, and child care.  Illich 
does not mention prenuptial agreements in Gender, but, if he had, 
he likely would have decried courts allowing husbands to contract 
out of property sharing as yet another indictment of exchange-
based views of family.  In contrast, I see exchange as the solution 
more than the problem.  If family law fully recognized the value of 
both sides of the pair-bonding primal deal, it would remunerate 
homemakers doing the feminine work of care-giving and foregoing 
the masculine work of maximizing their human capital in wage 
labor. 
My proposal to more fully recognize the exchanges in families 
builds on the fact that contracting into a marriage means con­
tracting into the pair-bonding primal deal of exchanging economic 
support for the emotional, physical, and social support of 
“housewifely duties.”127  Family law recognizes this primal deal by 
mandating that divorcing couples share property—their house, say, 
or a retirement account—that either one acquired during the mar­
riage, under the assumption that the person making money and the 
one taking care of cooking, cleaning, and caretaking both helped 
get those assets.  But the contractual nature of relationships re­
quires that people be able to change the deal, since contracts, un­
like status relationships, are generally modifiable. 
Thus, family law since the 1970s has allowed married couples 
to “contract out” of the primal deal through prenuptial agreements 
127. Kowis v. Kowis, 658 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Mont. 1983) (upholding division of 
marital property based on wife’s contribution for “housewifely duties”). 
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429 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
that provide, basically, “what’s yours is yours and what’s mine is 
mine.”128  However, courts have not recognized that the spouses’ 
contracting out of the primal deal changes the nature of the marital 
contract.  While the usual marriage deal transforms two people to 
an “us,” the contractual refusal to share property transforms that 
“us,” back into “me” and “you.”  Most people do not enter premar­
ital contracts, so most ordinary families remain an “us.”  Accord­
ingly, most of the time, family law treats valuable things that 
spouses give each other as gifts, exchanges of years of financial sup­
port, for years of grocery shopping, meal preparation, cleaning, and 
child raising.  But in the relatively rare cases when the spouses con­
tract out of the pair-bonding primal deal, the marriage becomes 
foundationally different, no longer as much of a pair bond.  Rather 
than a two-way contract agreeing to share their wealth, it can be 
seen as what contract law calls an illusory promise.129 
When a prenuptial agreement demotes the pair-bonding pri­
mal deal to an illusory promise, courts should disregard the fiction 
of mutual gifts when one side stops giving.  Otherwise, the richer 
spouse gets a windfall.  The increased marketization of family life 
that Illich deplores, such as markets for housecleaners, shoppers, 
cooks, tutors, babysitters, drivers, and social secretaries, would en­
able courts to calculate the value of a homemaker’s contributions to 
a wage-earner’s wealth, and award her money in that amount (pos­
sibly with interest).  That change would both honor spouses’ free­
dom to contract—an essential freedom given the importance of 
voluntary, mutual exchanges in families and in society more gener­
ally—and also value both the feminine and masculine side of that 
primal deal. 
The very gender neutrality that Illich condemns as bad for wo­
men could help them.  Men, on average, have higher income and 
more wealth, and the contracts allow high wage-earners to shield 
that wealth away from the other spouse.130  Consequently, hus­
bands are more likely to suggest premarital contracts, and wives are 
more likely to resist enforcement of those contracts.  In those cases, 
family law should recognize the primal deal—both sides of it—that 
forms the backdrop of the initial, or background, marital bargain. 
128. See e.g., Banks v. Evans, 64 S.W.3d 746 (Ark. 2002); Rider v. Rider, 669 
N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 1996). 
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 2 cmt. e, 77 cmt. a (1981). 
130. Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the Uni­
form Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS 127, 127-28 (1993). 
32073-w
ne_34-2 S
heet N
o. 49 S
ide B
      08/21/2012   07:54:18
32073-wne_34-2 Sheet No. 49 Side B      08/21/2012   07:54:18
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-2\WNE205.txt unknown Seq: 26 13-AUG-12 9:22
 
430 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
An 1889 Iowa case clearly articulated the rule treating the fem­
inine side of the pair-bonding deal as a gift when it refused to en­
force a contract for a Mr. Miller to pay his wife $200 a year to “keep 
her home and family in a comfortable and reasonably good condi­
tion” in exchange for him providing “the necessary expenses of the 
family.”131  Mr. and Mrs. Miller also agreed that “past subjects and 
causes of dispute, disagreement and complaint” would be “abso­
lutely ignored and buried.”132  Apparently the Millers’ formal, writ­
ten agreement was an attempt to stay married after Mr. Miller 
spent family finances on another woman. The court refused to en­
force Mr. Miller’s promise to pay his wife for her homemaking, rea­
soning that her domestic labor was merely, in the court’s words, 
what “the law already required her to do.”133  As we will see in 
Case #3, Borelli v. Brusseau,134 this seemingly old-fashioned view 
remains good law in California today. 
If we allow one person in a marriage to contract out of his 
obligations, then the old rule should not apply.  A court should, 
thus, allow the richer spouse to keep his property as contractually 
agreed, but also offset that award with money for the homemaking 
spouse that reflects her time and effort grocery shopping, cooking, 
carpooling to and from school, and cleaning (just for starters).  But 
before we get to the law as it should be, we must address the law as 
it is. 
2.	 Case #1: Barry Bonds Hits a Home Run for Prenuptial 
agreements (But His Wife Loses Big Time) 
The divorce of baseball superstar Barry Bonds typifies the le­
gal rule that allows couples to enter prenuptial agreements. 
Granted, Bonds’ money and fame are highly atypical, evidenced by 
the fact that the trial judge had to recuse himself because of press 
reports that he had requested Barry’s autograph.135  The aspect of 
the case, though, that matters for our discussion is its statement of 
the general rule that married couples can “contract out” of the pri­
131. Miller v. Miller, 42 N.W. 641 (Iowa 1889). 
132. Id. at 641. 
133. Id. at 642.  The detail about Mr. Miller’s wandering appears in an earlier 
opinion in the same case, Miller v. Miller, 35 N.W. 464 (Iowa 1887). 
134. Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
135. Judge Who Heard Barry Bonds’ Child Support Case Has Withdrawn From 
the Case, JET, Sept. 26, 1994, at 48. 
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431 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
mal deal by explicitly saying that the one making the money gets to 
keep that money (and houses, cars, furniture, etc. bought with it).136 
Historically, couples could not contractually adjust the terms of 
their marriage.  A century ago, the law did not recognize contracts 
made by married women, but now courts assume that women are 
competent adults who should be bound by their contracts.137  In the 
words of a Pennsylvania case enforcing a prenuptial contract that 
limited an unemployed nurse’s share of property and alimony when 
she divorced her neurosurgeon husband, “[s]ociety has advanced 
. . . to the point where women are no longer regarded as the 
‘weaker’ party in marriage, or in society generally,” so that courts 
no longer presume “that women are uninformed, uneducated, and 
readily subjected to unfair advantage in marital agreements.”138 
Like any other contract, however, prenuptial contracts are not en­
forceable if they are involuntary (shown by factors like lack of inde­
pendent legal advice, too limited time to consider the contract 
terms, and duress), it is a one-way deal, or the people’s circum­
stances have changed drastically since they entered the 
agreement.139 
By 2000, Barry Bonds’ personal circumstances had changed 
sufficiently that he wanted out of his six-year marriage to Susann 
(known as Sun).  He had a $43 million, six-year contract to play for 
the San Francisco Giants,140 but when Barry and Sun met in Mon­
treal in 1987, he was not yet a superstar.  Both were twenty-three 
years old, and Barry was in his second year of playing for the Pitts­
burgh Pirates.141  Neither one could have known that he would play 
for twenty-two years, setting records like most Major League Base­
ball home runs in a season (73) and over his career (762) and be 
136. In re Marriage of Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 794-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
137. 1848 N.Y. LAWS 307, ch. 200 (Married Women’s Property Act, used as a 
model by other states); NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE (2001). 
138. Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990). 
139. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 349-54 (N.H. 2003) (prenup 
invalid due to disparity in parties’ age, experience, and access to independent advice); 
Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, 764 N.E.2d 950, 953-54 (N.Y. 2001) (remand to determine if 
otherwise valid prenup was unconscionable); Krejci v. Krejci, 667 N.W.2d 780, 788-89 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (prenup unenforceable due to failure to provide for appreciation 
in value during marriage); UNIF. PREMARITAL  AGREEMENT  ACT § 6(a)(2) (1983) 
(prenups unenforceable if unconscionable due to a party’s lack of knowledge or 
disclosure). 
140. Murray Chass, Giants Make Investment: $43 Million in Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 6, 1992, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/06/sports/baseball-giants­
make-investment-43-million-in-bonds.html. 
141. Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787. 
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named MVP seven times.142  She was newly emigrated from Swe­
den, working in a sports bar and harboring ambitions of doing 
makeup for the stars.143  Within months, they were living together, 
engaged, and planning to fly to Las Vegas for a small wedding.144 
The day before the wedding, Barry took Sun to his attorney’s office 
on the drive to the airport.145  There they signed an agreement that 
would fundamentally change their marriage by contracting out of 
Barry’s legal obligations to share property.  It read “[w]e agree that 
all the earnings and accumulations resulting from the other’s per­
sonal services, skill, efforts and work, together with all property ac­
quired with funds and income derived therefrom, shall be the 
separate property of that spouse.”146  In plain English, as Barry tes­
tified at trial, this meant “what’s mine is mine, what’s yours is 
yours.”147  At the time, Sun had no property or income, and Barry 
took care of all her expenses.148  Her job was being the baseball 
player’s wife, providing emotional and social support to him and 
later, their two children.  Whether or not Sun performed her side of 
the primal deal underlying many marriages,149 the court let Barry 
evade his half of the primal deal. 
The California Supreme Court ruled that Sun voluntarily 
signed the agreement.150  Unlike the lower court, the Supreme 
Court refused to see Sun as a timid victim bullied into signing the 
prenuptial agreement, instead describing her as an “intrepid” wo­
man who 
emigrated from her homeland at a young age, found employment 
and friends in a new country using two languages other than her 
native tongue, and in two years moved to yet another country, 
142. Barry Bonds Career Stats, MAJOR  LEAGUE  BASEBALL http://mlb.mlb.com/ 
team/player.jsp?player_id=111188 (last visited May 24, 2012). 
143. Appellant’s Opening Brief, In re Marriage of Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (Nos. A075328, A076586), 1997 WL 33562691. 
144. Id. 
145. Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788. 
146. Id. at 817 n.1. 
147. Id. at 817. 
148. Id. at 788 (noting Barry’s testimony that “Sun didn’t have anything. I paid 
for everything) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
149. Ken Hoover, Ex-friend Describes Sun Bonds’ Tantrums, S.F. CHRONICLE, 
Dec. 21, 1995, at A-25, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/1995/ 
12/21/MN72411.DTL; Eve Mitchell, Ex-Wife Says Bonds Beat Her Repeatedly During 
Marriage, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 7, 1995, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/arti­
cle.cgi?f=/e/a/1995/12/07/NEWS7115.dtl. 
150. In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 817 (Cal. 2000). 
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expressing the desire to take up a career and declaring to Barry 
that she “didn’t want his money.”151 
The court does not tell us domestic details like how much time Sun 
spent grocery shopping, preparing meals, and caring for their chil­
dren and the household.  Indeed, given the Bonds’ income, they 
may have hired a lot of help, and Sun’s job may have been to spend 
time at the gym and spa looking good, and to accompany Barry on 
the road.152  But most people running a household do their own 
grocery shopping, cooking, and other “housewifely tasks.”  Our 
next spouses, Claire and Samuel Faiman, were such a couple, 
though they were unusual for marrying late in life, and divorcing 
even later.  Their story shows how family law tends to ignore and 
devalue the tremendous contributions of keeping a household fed 
and watered (let alone healthy and safe), and also how legal doc­
trine could change to value that side of the pair-bonding deal. 
3.	 Case #2: Faiman v. Faiman153: Autumn Marriage & 
Wintery Divorce 
Claire and Samuel Faiman married when she was sixty-one, 
and he, ten years older.154  Both were divorced, with children from 
their earlier marriages.155  Because Samuel’s home and real estate 
business were in Connecticut, Claire had to leave her twenty-five­
year job in a Scarsdale, New York synagogue, the house she had 
lived in for over three decades, and the community where she had 
raised her children.156  While neither Claire nor Samuel was in the 
financial major leagues, his net worth (around $2.2 million) was 
around ten times hers (around $210,000, most of which was 
$150,000 equity in her house).157  Like many couples, their arrange­
ment reflected the primal deal, though he was stingier and more 
controlling than most providers. 
Samuel paid for most household expenses, giving Claire a 
weekly shopping allowance of $150-$300, but withholding it when 
they went on trips.158  He kept control over the bank accounts, and 
151. Id. at 837. 
152. See id. at 817. 
153. Faiman v. Faiman, No. FA074028181, 2008 WL 5481382 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 5, 2008). 
154. Id. at *1. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at *7. 
158. Id. at *2. 
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434 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
did not make her an owner of their home.159  She paid for her per­
sonal expenses out of her modest social security payments.160  De­
spite his tightfisted ways, Claire performed her part of the primal 
deal, shopping, cooking, and caring for Samuel through illnesses in­
cluding a triple bypass surgery, colon cancer, and leukemia that re­
quired chemotherapy.161  In addition to changing his bandages and 
colostomy bag, she also managed the household and business ac­
counts when he could not, though he removed her name from the 
accounts as soon as he recovered.162  Even during their divorce trial 
she served him breakfast, lunch, and dinner every day.163  Though 
Samuel had many faults—the judge described him as “secretive and 
controlling,” rude, and even physically abusive, having both pushed 
Claire out of bed with his foot and spat in her face—he at least was 
honest, testifying at trial that she was a “dutiful wife who kept a 
nice home.”164 
You cannot help but wonder why she put up with him. She did 
consider leaving when, two years into the marriage, he went to visit 
an old girlfriend in New Hampshire, leaving a note on the refrigera­
tor saying he would be back the next day.165  Claire stayed because, 
she explained to the court, she “loved him very much and did not 
want a divorce.”166  Though she did not say so on the record, she 
also may have stayed because she had given away the Scarsdale 
house to her son—losing her only significant asset—and because 
Samuel had demanded a prenuptial contract three days before their 
wedding.167 
Six weeks before the ceremony, Samuel said he wanted a pre­
nuptial agreement, and produced a one-page “yellowed” legal 
sheet.168  Claire talked to an attorney, and the couple went to the 
library to look at prenuptial agreement forms.  Samuel wanted to 
read them over, and later decided he did not need a prenuptial con­
tract.  But then, three days before the wedding, he changed his 
mind.169  He called Claire in New York, where she was still working 
159. Id. at *3. 
160. Id. at *2. 
161. Id. at *1. 
162. Id. at *4. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at *3-4. 
165. Id. at *3. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at *5. 
168. Id. at *4. 
169. Id. at *5. 
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435 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
for the synagogue, and told her she had to come to Connecticut 
because they had “some papers to sign.”170  She got the permission 
of her rabbi—also her employer—to leave work early, and drove an 
hour and a half to his house.  He was waiting for her in the drive­
way, and drove the two of them to his lawyer’s office. There she 
met Samuel’s lawyer and the lawyer he had gotten for her, and saw 
the prenuptial agreement for the first time.  She was “all shook up,” 
she testified, and surprised because she thought the papers would 
be about Samuel giving her $100,000 so she would not have 
problems with his children after he died.171  Instead, the agreement 
said that he would keep all the money and property to himself. The 
attorney who met with her for fifteen or thirty minutes testified that 
she “seemed surprised at what was being discussed.”172  Even Sa­
muel’s attorney said that the whole meeting was “rushed.”173  Sa­
muel told her “no agreement, no wedding.”174  Claire did not sign 
the agreement right away.  Instead, she took it home and signed it 
the next day without ever reading it.175 
When Claire and Samuel finally did divorce in 2008, they had 
been married twenty years.176  She was 81 and he was 91, but still 
strong enough to try to fight off her claim to any wealth acquired 
during their marriage.  The question at trial was whether to enforce 
the prenuptial agreement that waived Claire’s right to alimony or 
any property held in Samuel’s name.177  That meant nearly all the 
property, because he had made sure that just about everything was 
his, and his alone.  The court ruled in Claire’s favor, and refused to 
enforce the premarital agreement.178  Claire received $450,000 in 
alimony.179  Alimony is usually paid in installments, but the court 
apparently suspected Samuel would resist paying, so it ordered him 
to pay her $75,000 immediately, and the rest in installments. 
Who gets the money or property matters the most to the peo­
ple involved, of course, but for the rest of us, especially lawyers, 
judges, and future litigants, the rationale for the ruling is most im­
portant.  In Faiman v. Faiman, the judge reasoned that Claire re­
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at *6. 
173. Id. at *5. 
174. Id. at *6, *9. 
175. Id. at *5. 
176. Id. at *1. 
177. Id. at *6. 
178. Id. at *10. 
179. Id. at *11. 
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436 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
ceived alimony from Samuel because her signature was not fully 
voluntary.180  She did not have time to review the agreement, Sa­
muel’s lawyer drafted the agreement and picked Claire’s lawyer, 
and no one told her what she was giving up. The lawyers did not 
explain to her about background legal rules that would entitle her 
to share in Samuel’s property, to ask for alimony, and to determine 
just how much Samuel had. 
The court’s reliance on voluntariness to invalidate the Faimans’ 
prenuptial contract missed the point.  It does not help people in 
Claire’s position who do have time to review the prenuptial agree­
ment, and independent counsel, and still find they married people 
who took everything and gave nothing.  The solution need not be a 
return to the old rule that did not allow spouses to tailor the terms 
of their financial relationship, much as Illich might like to return to 
a golden age in which he imagines family relationships were un­
tainted by exchange.  Instead, courts could take a middle ground 
that both honors spouses’ freedom of contract—recognizing that 
hyper earners like Barry Bonds should be able to shield some of 
their assets—and still keep them from taking undue advantage of 
their spouses who contribute, if not half, at least something, to that 
high income by keeping the refrigerator stocked, beds made, laun­
dry done, and kitchen clean, not to mention kids fed, and reasona­
bly clean, healthy, and well-behaved.  The current state of the law 
creates, in economic lingo that Illich would likely suggest applies to 
all economic thought, a moral hazard, allowing richer spouses to 
use prenuptial agreements to take unfair advantage of their poorer 
spouses.  The richer ones like Barry Bonds and Samuel Faiman can 
accept, perhaps even demand, their spouses’ time and effort cook­
ing, cleaning, raising children, providing nursing care, and maintain­
ing a household, without giving anything in return. 
Applying this rationale might lead to a different outcome in 
cases like Faiman and Bonds.  If courts look at what each spouse 
did under the pair-bonding deal as well as the terms written into a 
premarital agreement, they would get a fuller picture of what 
spouses exchanged, and what, therefore, they owe one another 
when they divorce.  We do not know if Sun Bonds ably managed an 
army of paid assistants to cook and clean, looked good herself, 
managed the press, and travelled with Barry during baseball season. 
She may, instead, have been difficult, drunk, or dirty much of the 
time.  A trial court could consider these facts, just as it currently 
180. Id. at *9-10. 
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437 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
examines the voluntariness of a signature based on the time, place, 
and duration of a meeting, a person’s ability to hire an independent 
lawyer, or whether language barriers or pregnancy hamper free 
consent.  It need not dissect every moment of daily life.  Instead, 
just as a court determines where a child will live based on who is the 
child’s primary caretaker—looking to who cooks, drives to and 
from school, bathes, helps with homework, disciplines, etc.—courts 
could consider broad-brush evidence about who shopped, cleaned, 
and kept track of when the kids were due for vaccinations and den­
tal appointments.  Family law could create rebuttable presumptions 
that when one spouse works fewer hours, at a lower-paying job, she 
is likely doing more of the domestic chores that benefit a whole 
household. 
B.	 Improving Family Law by Fully Recognizing Exchange at the 
Heart of the Pair-Bonding Primal Deal 
Faiman v. Faiman illustrates how family law might recognize a 
new defense to enforcing a premarital agreement, which I will call 
“breach of the pair-bonding deal.”  It could both recognize the ex­
change built into the very fabric of ordinary marriage, and give par­
ties freedom of contract consistent with the central role of exchange 
in families.  The defense could include three steps: 
Step One: The court could evaluate whether the prenuptial 
contract was voluntary and any other arguments that would defeat 
enforcement (uncertain terms, for example, or the lack of a signa­
ture).  If a defense like voluntariness defeats enforcement, the court 
need not go further, and would simply apply the background family 
law sharing rules.  But if no other defenses apply, then the court 
could consider whether one party breached the primal deal. 
Step Two: The court could compare the marriage to the typical 
pair bond deal to determine whether it was breached.  Here, the 
evidence suggests that Claire held up her end of the pair bond deal, 
but Samuel did not.  She cared for him, morning, noon, and night, 
and barely got a thank-you in return. The prenuptial agreement 
formalized that one-sidedness by allowing Samuel to contract out of 
his end of the primal deal.  Claire, consequently, did not get the 
financial sharing that presumably was at least part of the reason she 
performed all those housewifely duties.181  Accordingly, their mar­
riage was no longer a pair-bond deal, but instead an illusory prom­
ise.  Courts should disregard the legal fiction that housewifely tasks 
181. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17, 71 (1981). 
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438 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
are gifts, because Samuel got everything and Claire got nothing.  In 
other words, the prenuptial agreement transformed the relationship 
from “us” to two individuals.  Thus, family law should award Claire 
an amount approximating the value of two decades of 24/7 domestic 
support. 
Step Three: The court could apply contract doctrine or other 
areas of law to put a value on the domestic services that a richer 
spouse would otherwise get for free.  While the prenuptial agree­
ment would bar Claire from the full equitable share she would get 
under family law, she could still get reimbursed for what Samuel 
would have had to pay for round-the clock, seven-days-a-week, 
shopping, cooking, cleaning, laundry, and home health care while 
he was ill, perhaps under a theory of restitution (preventing his ill-
gotten gain).  If he also promised to give her, say, the house when 
he died, in exchange for that beyond-the-call-of-duty work empty­
ing his colostomy bag herself instead of hiring an aide to do it, then 
a court should enforce that promise. 
Current family law wrongly devalues these life-enriching, and 
even life-saving, tasks by invoking the legal fiction that reciprocal 
exchanges under the pair-bonding deal are only gifts.  A California 
case shows how unfair that fiction can be to spouses who perform 
the feminine side of the pair-bonding deal. 
1. Case #3: Caring about Care Work: Borelli v. Brusseau 
According to a good number of family law scholars, Borelli v. 
Brusseau182 is wrongly decided.183  Viewing the case within the 
framework of the pair-bonding primal deal explains why, and also 
how family law can correct the mistake in future cases.  As the rule 
currently stands, Michael Borelli got out of his promise to share his 
wealth, but Hildegard Borelli was held to her end of the pair-bond 
deal, which required her to personally empty Michael’s bedpans.184 
Seventy-something-year-old San Francisco businessman 
Michael Borelli married Hildegard Borelli in 1980, when she was 
39.185  His finances were closer to Samuel Faiman than to Barry 
Bonds, as he owned a successful meat company and other proper­
182. Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
183. Adrienne Davis, Round Table Discussion: Subversive Legal Moments?, 12 
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 197, 219-20 (2003); Silbaugh, supra note 6, at 32-33; Joan Williams, 
Do Wives Own Half? Winning for Wives After Wendt, 32 CONN. L. REV. 249, 257-62 
(1999). 
184. Borelli, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d at 20. 
185. Id. at 17. 
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439 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
ties.  The day before their wedding, Michael and Hildegard signed a 
premarital agreement that apparently reserved most of his property 
(worth around $1.5 million) for his daughter from a prior mar­
riage.186  Unlike Sun Bonds and Claire Faiman, Hildegard did not 
challenge the validity of this prenuptial contract.  Instead, she 
sought to enforce an oral agreement they made later to modify it.187 
That oral agreement brought their arrangement back toward the 
pair-bond deal and California community property rules. Yet the 
California courts refused to allow Hildegard to alter her obligation 
of emotional and physical care, and enforced only Michael’s con­
tracting out of his half of the primal deal.188 
Like Samuel Faiman, Michael fell ill within a few years of get­
ting married, suffering heart problems and a stroke.  By 1988, 
Michael’s doctors recommended that he live in a rest home given 
his need for round-the-clock nursing care.  Understandably, he pre­
ferred to live at home, even though it required modifying the house 
to account for his limited mobility.  Maybe he realized that his re­
duced marital obligations under their prenuptial agreement would 
justify Hildegard in feeling less obliged under the feminine half of 
the pair bond deal.  In any case, Michael offered to alter the pre­
nuptial contract by changing his will to give Hildegard some of his 
property (valued at around $500,000, including money for her 
daughter’s education) if she would disregard the doctors’ advice 
and provide the nursing care herself, at their home.189 
Hildegard performed her part of their deal, personally provid­
ing round-the-clock nursing care for Michael until his death the fol­
lowing year.190  But Michael did not.  While the California courts 
have allowed richer spouses like Michael Borelli and Barry Bonds 
to contract out of the masculine side of the pair bond deal, they 
refused to let Hildegard similarly alter her feminine obligations of 
care under the primal deal. 
To reach its conclusion, the court had to ignore that Michael 
himself had slipped out of his half of the pair-bond deal.  Instead, 
the court wagged its finger at Hildegard for trying to get something 
for doing what marriage itself requires, asserting that “a wife is obli­
gated by the marriage contract to provide nursing type care to an ill 
186. Wendy L. Hillger, Note, Borelli v. Brusseau: Must a Spouse also be a Nurse? 
A Feminist Critique, 25 PAC. L.J. 1387, 1414-16 (1994). 
187. Borelli, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d at 20. 
188. Id. at 17-18. 
189. Id. at 17-18. 
190. Id. at 18. 
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husband.”191  Echoing the century-old language of the Iowa Su­
preme Court quoted above,192 the court in Borelli concluded that a 
husband’s agreement to compensate a wife undermines the public 
policy of wives caring for husbands.193  Hildegard, as the poorer 
spouse, whose contributions came in the form of care, feeding, and 
cleaning, had no right to contractually adjust her side of the deal. 
The court invoked a sentimental justification for depriving her of 
that contractual freedom: 
the marital duty of support [under California law] includes caring 
for a spouse who is ill . . . .  [It] means more than the physical 
care someone could be hired to provide.  Such support also en­
compasses sympathy[,] comfort[,] love, companionship and affec­
tion.  Thus, the duty of support can no more be “delegated” to a 
third party than the statutory duties of fidelity and mutual 
respect.194 
The court’s contempt for Hildegard’s conduct as “unseemly” and 
“sickbed bargaining”195 seems strange in light of Michael’s earlier 
bargaining to get out of his support obligations.  By concluding that 
“even if few things are left that cannot command a price, marital 
support remains one of them,”196 the court effectively declared that 
spouses cannot contract out of their feminine obligations of tending 
support but can contract out of their masculine obligations of finan­
cial support.  It could only reach this conclusion by willfully ignor­
ing the fact that Michael himself had already, at the very outset of 
their marriage, contracted out of his own (financial) support obliga­
tions to Hildegard.  Far from sex neutrality, or gender neutrality, 
this outcome applies a double standard to masculine and feminine 
duties under the pair bond deal.  It is hard to see here how Illich’s 
ideal of gender asymmetry protects women, when this gender-
asymmetrical rule so harmed Hildegard Borelli. 
A strong dissenting opinion took the majority opinion in Bo­
relli to task for its double standard, highlighting the fact that 
Michael already opted out of his own obligations of marital sup­
port.197  Pointing out that the majority opinion’s reliance on old, 
pre-World War II cases reflected its archaic assumptions about mar­
191. Id. at 19. 
192. Miller v. Miller, 42 N.W. 641, 642 (Iowa 1889). 
193. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19. 
194. Id. at 20 (citations omitted). 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 23. 
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441 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
riage, Justice Poché asserted that “modern attitudes toward mar­
riage have changed,”198 in that many married women work outside 
the home, and many husbands do “domestic chores that make a 
house a home.”199  Given that California recognizes spouses’ rights 
to contract with one another, and the changing roles of men and 
women in marriage and society more generally, he reasoned, 
spouses’ duties to provide medical care for one another should not 
be taken to impose a state-mandated duty to personally provide 
that nursing care.200  Writing when Bill Clinton was president, the 
dissent warned of grave consequences of not enforcing Michael and 
Hildegard’s agreement.  To not enforce, it cautioned, meant that “if 
Mrs. Clinton becomes ill, President Clinton must drop everything 
and personally care for her.”201  Today, in 2012, Hillary Clinton is 
the Secretary of State, and the Borelli decision would require her to 
drop everything to care for Bill personally if he became ill, jeopard­
izing diplomatic relations and other issues of national importance. 
That cannot possibly be the right outcome. 
Instead, Hildegard should be able to argue that her promise to 
care for Michael personally was a contract, supported by considera­
tion in the form of Michael promising to contract back into the pair 
bond deal by providing for her and her daughter financially when 
he died.  As long as she can prove the fact of their agreement 
(which was apparently oral), and it was voluntary, courts should en­
force it.  In other words, courts should treat both sides of the pair-
bond exchange as contractual—legally enforceable—instead of 
treating just the masculine side of the exchange as a contractual, 
and the feminine side as a mere deal that courts will not honor. 
While a change in legal doctrine to treat masculine and femi­
nine sides of the pair bond deal the same way would mostly benefit 
women, it could also benefit some men, as illustrated by the next 
case. 
2.	 Case #4: What’s Good for the Goose is Good for the 
Gander 
The cases we have discussed, Bonds, Faiman, and Borelli, all 
involve richer men and relatively poorer women.  But sometimes 
the woman is the richer spouse.  As Illich rightly observes, gender is 
198. Id. at 24 (Poché, J., dissenting). 
199. Id. at 23. 
200. Id. at 24 (Poché, J., dissenting). 
201. Id. 
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442 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
not tied to people’s genitals, but instead to the work they do within 
a system of vernacular gender.202  Accordingly, family law should 
treat the feminine side of the pair-bond deal the same whether it is 
performed by a man or by a woman.  As the following case shows, 
both sides of the primal deal—financial support and emotional/do­
mestic support—can be done by either men or women, and the only 
equality in family law rules here is that courts devalue “feminine” 
work done by men as much as they devalue its performance by 
women. 
Seattle law firm partner Carla DewBerry was the one who 
benefitted from her oral prenuptial agreement with Emanuel 
George.203  At the time of their agreement, he was a music industry 
executive and she was completing her education. Worried that she 
might become a financial drain on him, he agreed to marry only if 
she agreed to remain employed, not get fat, have a home to return 
to if the marriage failed, and treat all property and income as sepa­
rate, instead of family, property.204  Carla agreed. Throughout their 
fourteen-year marriage, even after the birth of their children, they 
never jointly owned a house.205  Carla owned the house, and Em­
manuel would pay a set amount each month for living expenses like 
utilities.  (Emmanuel owned houses in Texas and California that he 
had bought before their marriage.) They assiduously maintained 
their financial independence, keeping separate bank accounts, and 
naming their children, rather than one another, as beneficiaries on 
retirement accounts.  By the time they separated in 2000, Carla was 
a successful lawyer earning more than $1 million a year, and Em­
manuel had just switched from driving a UPS truck to training to 
become a longshoreman.206  The Washington courts enforced their 
contract to keep all property separate, allowing Carla to keep $2.3 
million, and leaving Emanuel with $600,000 and salary of less than 
$48,000 a year.207  The court justified its ruling by stating the gen­
eral rule of enforcing prenuptial agreements: “[t]here is nothing un­
fair about two well-educated working professionals agreeing to 
preserve the fruits of their labor for their individual benefit.”208 
202. ILLICH, supra note 1, 74, 80-81. 
203. DewBerry v. George, 62 P.3d 525, 526 (Wash. App. Div. 2003), cert. denied, 
77 P.3d 651 (Wash. 2003). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 527. 
206. Id. at 527-28. 
207. Id. at 527. 
208. Id. at 531. 
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443 2012] EXCHANGE AS A CORNERSTONE OF FAMILIES 
These cases, Bonds, Faiman, Borelli, and DewBerry, together, 
show the intimate exchanges in families.  Marriage bound the 
spouses, elevating the pair bond deal to a contract that the law en­
forces through alimony and property sharing rules.  In all four 
cases, the spouses chose to contract out of the pair bond deal, but 
courts only enforced contracting out of the masculine side of the 
deal.  Courts indulged in the legal fiction that the feminine side of 
the deal is only a gift to mask the value of those housewifely tasks, 
effectively ruling that the valuable homemaking work that keeps 
families running is actually, according to family law, worthless. 
The problem in these cases is not gender neutrality, as Illich 
might claim.  The injustice is that courts tend to treat only half of 
the pair bond obligation as a contract—legally enforceable—and 
the other half as a mere deal.  The cases also show how right Illich 
was in asserting the depth of humanity’s tie to gender. Very few 
cases involve rich women like Carla DewBerry keeping property to 
themselves.  Moreover, the near-ubiquity of spouses exchanging 
masculine and feminine work shows how both exchange and gender 
lie at the very heart of families.  Exchange, in other words, facili­
tates gender complementarity in ordinary families, a far cry from 
Illich’s claim that exchange is a newcomer to the family scene.  A 
feminist solution to the problem of courts devaluing the feminine 
side of the pair bond deal is to have them honor both sides of the 
exchange, not indulge in the fiction that exchanges are not occur­
ring at all.  Illich mistakenly asserts that symmetry and exchange 
demote women to second-class citizenship.  Instead, fully recogniz­
ing the value of both the feminine and masculine sides of the pair 
bond deal could elevate the value of tending work, and thus of wo­
men generally, since women are much more likely to perform that 
work.  To use Illich’s colorful phrase about the usually thankless 
work of homemakers, “shadow work,” family law recognition of the 
value of that work could bring it out of the shadows, illuminating its 
tremendous value to children, men, and women.209 
CONCLUSION 
Illich, in his zest to valorize pre-capitalist subsistence-level cul­
tures, overlooks the exchange that makes all families—pre-capital­
209. Tending work often extends beyond the nuclear family.  For example, most 
of work done caring for elderly relatives is done by women. TED FISHMAN, SHOCK OF 
GRAY 96 (2010).  Many of those in-family caretakers are daughters in law, nieces, 
grandchildren and others outside the immediate nuclear family. 
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444 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:405 
ist, capitalist, post-industrial capitalist—form and last. Far from 
eroding our humanity, exchanges made our humanity possible. 
One primal deal is the pair bond between men and women, and 
another is the alloparenting bond between mothers and others— 
usually other females—who help them care for children. Yet family 
law recognizes only part of the pair-bond deal.  When a couple mar­
ries, they contract into property sharing and tending contracts, 
which, to some extent, courts enforce, under the theory that both 
people contributed to its acquisition: one through paid labor, and 
the other through the care work that keeps a household going. 
However, courts also allow richer spouses to contract out of the 
masculine side of the  deal—by refusing to share property—but do 
not allow poorer spouses to adjust their tending obligations under 
the pair bond deal. 
Modern marriage, therefore, is grounded in a highly gendered 
exchange, the very opposite of Illich’s contention that it is a 
“genderless economic partnership between a wage laborer and a 
shadow worker.”210  Family law falls short by recognizing too little 
exchange within families, not too much.  It should, in particular, ex­
pand its recognition of the pair-bond deal to value the feminine side 
of this exchange.  If richer spouses, usually men like Barry Bonds 
and Michael Borelli, but sometimes women like Carla DewBerry, 
contract out of their obligations to remunerate their homemaking 
spouses for making “feminine” contributions under the primal deal, 
then courts should recognize that those premarital contracts trans­
form a marriage from a pair bond, an “us,” to two separate individ­
uals.  Once courts see the way that prenuptial contracts can destroy 
reciprocity, they can award homemaking spouses the value of the 
tending work they did, from making children’s lunches to sickbed 
care.  Family law’s current failure to recognize both sides of the pair 
bond exchange penalizes feminine behaviors, the very injustice that 
Illich wrote his book to address. 
210. ILLICH, supra note 1, at 168. 
